Florida Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 1

Article 14

September 1971

Compensation for Loss of Consortium: The Wife's Cause of
Action
Frederick D. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frederick D. Smith, Compensation for Loss of Consortium: The Wife's Cause of Action, 24 Fla. L. Rev. 198
(1971).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/14

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA
Smith: Compensation
for
Loss of Consortium:
The Wife's Cause
Action
LAW REVIEW
[V/ol.ofXXIV

cution in its direct case. 45 The Court emphasized that the necessity for
truthfulness in the adversary process necessitated the limitation upon Miranda.4 6 Nonetheless the incentive to violate Miranda is clearly present. If
an incriminating statement is obtained illegally, it may prevent the defendant from testifying at his trial47 and, in effect, deprive him by illegal
means of his exercise of a constitutional right.
ROBERT C.

JOYNER

COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM:
THE WIFE'S CAUSE OF ACTION
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971)
Petitioner brought an action to recover damages for loss of consortium
resulting from total disability to her husband sustained in an automobile
collision, which was proximately caused by the negligence of respondent. The
trial court denied the wife's cause of action and an appeal was taken to
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which affirmed.' The Supreme Court
of Florida reversed and unanimously HELD, a wife is entitled to compensation for loss of consortium when her husband has been negligently injured,
provided the husband has a cause of action against the same defendant2
Consortium is defined by Florida case law as a composite of those relationships between husband and wife that are basic to the amity of a
marital union: comfort, protection, society, companionship, love, counsel,
sexual relations, solace, assistance, and fellowship. 3 Florida has long recognized the common law right of the husband to recover damages for loss of
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 225, 226.
See text accompanying note 37 supra.

1. 233 So. 2d 190 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
2. 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971). Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of Florida
pursuant to a petition supported by a certificate from the Fourth District Court of Appeal
stating that the decision was one involving a question of great public interest. See FLA.
CONST. art. V, §4 (2).
3. See, e.g., Ligthow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776, 778 (Fla. 1954); Ripley v. Ewell, 61
So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1952); Florida Cent. & P.R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 73, 25 So. 338, 347
(1899).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 14

1971]

CASE COMMENTS

4
his wife's consortium when she is injured by tie tort of a third person.
But prior to the instant case, Florida courts had twice refused to recognized
such a cause of action for the wife,5 reasoning that a departure from the
common law must come from the legislature.6
At common law the wife was not vested with an interest in the services
of her husband and thus was denied the right to recover for loss of consortium. 7 The husband and wife existed in master-servant relationship and
only the husband, by virtue of his superior role, was afforded the property
interest necessary to support a cause of action.8 While this archaic common
law approach was adopted by statute in Florida,9 the absence of legislation
in other areas has not, in the past, precluded Florida courts from overruling
common law principles. 10 For example, prior to the statutory repeal of the
causes of action for alienation of affections,"1 a wife was able to recover for
loss of her husband's services resulting from an intentional invasion of the
marital relationship.' 2 Similarly, a widow has a cause of action for loss of
consortium under the Florida wrongful death statute 3 when her husband
is killed by a negligent tort-feasor.14 Neither action was maintainable at
common law.
Despite a willingness to overrule common law principles in some instances, the court in Ripley v. Ewell 5 felt bound by the common law' 6 and

4. See, e.g., Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 188 So. 780 (1931). See also
FLL STAT. §2.01 (1969), which adopts the common law.
5. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Wilson v. Redding, 145 So. 2d 252 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
6. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1952); Wilson v. Redding, 145 So. 2d 252 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
7. See, e.g., Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
8. 3 BLAcKSTONE COMMENTARES *143: "We may observe that in these relative injuries,
notice is only taken of the wrong done to the superior of the parties related by the breach
and dissolution of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom;
while the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for [this]
...

may be ... that the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or

assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and
therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot recover damages for
beating her husband, for she hath no separate interest in any thing during her coverture."
9. See FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1969). See also Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1952).
10. In Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 495, 1 So. 2d 480, 481 (1941), the court
characterized this attitude by noting: "When the reason for any rule of law ceases, the
rule should be discarded."
11. Fx-".STAT. §771.01 (1969).
12. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Kilgore, 154 Fla. 841, 19 So. 2d 805 (1944).
18.

FA. STAT. §768.02

(1969).

14. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 509 (1950). Similarly, the
court has overturned the common law in the areas of wrongful death, Waller v. First Sav.
& Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); suits against married women for torts committed ex contractu, Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932); and governmental immunity to tort action, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1957).
15. 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
16. "While we should not hesitate to declare the law as we find it, even though the
unwary who have been illadvised in their action may suffer, we should not by judicial
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consequently refused to recognize a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium. The court reasoned that if it departed from the common law it
would confront the choice of ignoring either the reasons for the wife's inability to recover or the reasons for creating a cause of action in the husband.y7 The court preferred to uphold the husband's rights under the common law.18
The Ripley court expressed additional concern that if a wife could sue
for loss of consortium, settled claims would be reopened and "new liabilities
imposed upon persons who have already paid once for the result of their
negligent acts." 1 9 In the instant case the court receded from this position
and recognized that negligent tort-feasors have in the past avoided making
full compensation because of their immunity to suits by wives for loss of
consortium.20 The court stated, however, that only those claims not barred
by the statute of limitations2l will be allowed.22
At least twenty-five other jurisdictions now recognize a wife's right to
compensation for loss of consortium, 23 and there is virtually unanimous
agreement with this trend among legal commentators.2 4 In addition, the
Married Women's Property Act 25 abrogates the disabilities of coverture under
the common law2s and the Florida constitution eliminates any disparity between the rights of men and women.27 The holding in the instant case indicates that Florida has aligned itself with the emerging weight of authority.
Present Florida law does not allow a child, however, to recover damages
for loss of services when his parent is disabled as a result of the negligence
of a third person.28 Although the instant case may establish the predicate
for such an action, other jurisdictions, including those allowing compensation to the wife, have rejected such a cause of action by the child.29 The

fiat make changes in established law that will injuriously affect many persons who could

not possibly foresee or anticipate such action on our part." Id. at 424.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cf. 247 So. 2d at 44.
FLA. SrAT. §95.11 (4) (1969).
247 So. 2d at 45.
See 247 So. 2d at 42 n.l for a list of these jurisdictions.
Id. at 42 n.2.
25. FLA. STAT. §708.08 (Supp. 1970), amending Fla. Stat. §708.08 (1969).
26. Id.
27. FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §5.
28. See Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1952).
29. See, e.g., Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Cir. 1952). "'This
Court confesses that it has been difficult for it on the basis of natural justice to reach the
conclusion that this type of an action will not lie. When a child loses the love and
companionship of a parent, it is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and precious.
Courts should ever be alert to widen the circle of justice to conform to the changing
needs and conditions of society. At the same time a lower Court should be cautious in
laying down a completely new rule in the light of prior holdings of our Court of Appeals
indicating hesitancy to extend the right of recovery . . . to a child." Id. at 741.
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reasons for these holdings are diverse: the possibility of extortionary 0 and
multiple litigation,31 inability to define the age at which the child's right
would cease,32 and the inability of a jury to cope with the question of
damages.3 3 These objections are not peculiar to this cause of action, however, and are dealt with adequately as a matter of course in other actions.34
Moreover, a child's right to compensation for loss of consortium may be
analogized35 to the wife's right of action, to a child's right to recover for
loss of a parent's services under the wrongful death act, 86 or (to the common law
cause of action existing in a parent for the loss of a child's services.- r Further,
several jurisdictions have recognized a right to compensation by the child
for alienation of his parent's affections. 38 This seems to indicate that the
child's loss is as great as the wife's where both are deprived of the love, counsel, and protection of the husband-father.
Workmen's compensation is another area in which the instant case may
have repercussions. The Florida statute delimiting the liability of an employer under workman's compensation provides that only the injured employee may bring suit against the employer for damages.3 9 The principle
case adopted the reasoning of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.4O in which a wife was
allowed to sue an employer for loss of consortium although her husband
sued under workmen's compensation.41 The court in Hitaffer stated that no
person would be allowed a cause of action against the employer by subroga42
tion of the employee's right, but a third person could sue in his own right.
The court recognized that the wife's right to compensation from the employer
for loss of consortium was a right vested in her and arose directly from the
injury to her husband.43 This reasoning implies there is a duty by the em-

30.
81.
32.
33.
34.

Miller v. Levine, 130 Me. 153, 160, 154 A. 174, 178 (1931).
Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 135, 273 N.Y.S. 912, 913 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
83 U. PA. L. REv. 276, 277 (1934).
Id.
See, e.g., McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1954). See also W. PROSSER, ToRmS

919 (3d ed. 1964).
35. "[T]hough the court will not necessarily strike out a claim in limine because of its
novelty, it will regard the onus as being on the plaintiff to show some close analogy with
an existing head of liability before admitting the claim into the arcana of acknowledged
categories of tortious responsibility." 29 CAN. B. REv. 210, 215 (1951) (footnotes omitted).
36. FIA. STAT. §768.02 (1969). See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133
Fla. 195, 182 So. 911 (1938).
37. See Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926).
38. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D.
Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 111. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
39. FLA. STAT. §440.11 (1969). There is a provision, however, for suit by the personal
representative of the employee upon his death.
40. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
41. Id. Compare FLA. STAT. §440.11 (1969), with D.C. CoDE ANN. §36-501 (1969). Both
provide that only the eipployee, or his representative if the employee dies, may bring an
acton for damages against the employer.
42. 183 F.2d 811, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
43. Id.
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ployer to the spouse of an employee. Similarly, a federal district court in
Florida has stated: "[O]ne who desires to recover damages from an employer...
must show an independent duty owed by the employer to the third party
and a breach of that duty."44 Florida's recognition of the wife's right of
action for loss of consortium may therefore enable her to sue an employer
when the husband has a cause of action under workmen's compensation.
The present case indicates that common law disabilities need no longer
bar a plaintiff who seeks compensation for damages resulting from injuries
that invade the family relationship. This enlightened decision gives cause
for optimism that Florida courts will give increasing protection to the
interests of all members of a family in tort litigation.
FREDERICK

D.

SMITH

44. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427, 428
(S.D. Fla. 1967).
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